school preparation, interest in SEMT, choice of college major, barriers, use of disability support service, critical incidents, and education and career goals. To address the research objectives, the proposed project involves an in-depth study of a sample (n=20) of different types of postsecondary educational institutions (research universities, 4-year colleges, disability-friendly universities, and community colleges). At each institution, three groups of students will be surveyed: students with disabilities majoring in SEMT, students with disabilities majoring in other fields, and students without disabilities majoring in SEMT. Interviews with SEMT faculty at each institution will also be conducted. This approach will allow for exploration of the ways in which students with disabilities majoring in SEMT are similar to and different from other groups of students, as well as the views of faulty toward students with disabilities. The project is planned as a one-time data collection what will occur in the spring of 1996. Burden estimates are as follows:

Respondents	Number of interviews	Estimated time in minutes	Total burden (hours)
SEMT students with disabilities	725	30	363
Non-SEMT students with disabilities	375	25	156
SEMT students without disabilities	375	25	156
SEMT faculty members	200	15	50

Send Comments to Herman Fleming, Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 485, Arlington, VA 22230. Written comments should be received by January 15, 1996.

Dated: November 9, 1995.

Herman G. Fleming,

NSF Clearance Officer.

[FR Doc. 95–28241 Filed 11–14–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–220]

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Notice of WIthdrawal of Application for Amendment to Facility Operating License

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has granted the request of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) to withdraw its September 1, 1994, application for proposed amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR–63 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1, located in Oswego County, New York.

The proposed amendment would have revised the pressure/temperature limits in the plant technical specifications.

The Commission had previously issued a Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment published in the Federal Register on October 12, 1994, (59 FR 51620). On September 22, 1995, the staff issued a denial of the amendment request which was noticed in the Federal Register on September 29, 1995, (60 FR 50650). However, by letter dated October 27, 1995, the licensee withdrew the proposed change.

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated September 1, 1994, the staff's denial dated September 22, 1995, and the licensee's letter dated October 27, 1995, which withdrew the application for license amendment. The above documents are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of November 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Gordon E. Edison,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate I–1, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–28155 Filed 11–14–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[Docket No. 40–6659]

Federal Register Notice of Amendment To Change Reclamation Milestone Date in Source Material License SUA–551 Held by Petrotomics Company for Its Shirley Basin, Wyoming Uranium Mill

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Amendment of Source Material License SUA–551 to change a reclamation milestone date.

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has amended Petrotomics Company's (Petrotomics') Source Material License SUA–551 for Shirley Basin Wyoming to change a reclamation milestone date. This amendment was requested by Petrotomics by letter dated September 5, 1995, and its receipt by NRC was noticed in the Federal Register on September 27, 1995.

The license amendment modifies License Condition 50 to change the completion date for a site-reclamation milestone. The new date approved by the NRC extends completion of placement of final radon barrier on the tailings pile by one year, and ten months. Petrotomics attributes the delays to (1) NRC's re-examination of cover design for performance with current standards and practices, and (2) short construction season at the Shirley Basin site. Based on review of Petrotomics' submittal, the NRC staff concludes that the delays are attributable to factors beyond the control of Petrotomics, the proposed work is scheduled to be completed as expeditiously as practicable, and the added risk to the public health and safety is not significant.

An environmental assessment is not required since this action is categorically excluded under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(11), and an environmental report from the licensee is not required by 10 CFR 51.60(b)(2).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Petrotomics' license, including an amended License Condition 50, and the NRC staff's technical evaluation of the amendment request are being made available for public inspection at the NRC's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street, NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mohammad W. Haque, High-Level Waste and Uranium Recovery Projects Branch, Division of Waste Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Telephone (301) 415–6640.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of November 1995.

Joseph J. Holonich,

Chief, High-Level Waste and Uranium Recovery Projects Branch, Division of Waste Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 95–28156 Filed 11–14–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[Docket No. 50–344]

Portland General Electric Company, Trojan Nuclear Plant; Exemption

I.

Portland General Electric Company (PGE or the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating (Possession Only) License No. NPF–1, which authorizes possession and maintenance of the Trojan Nuclear Plant (Trojan or the plant). The license provides, among other things, that the plant is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The plant is a permanently shutdown, defueled, pressurized light-water reactor undergoing the initial stages of decommissioning, which is located along the banks of the Columbia River in Columbia County, Oregon.

II.

Trojan received an operating license on November 21, 1975. On January 4, 1993, the Directors of PGE voted to accept the recommendation of the PGE management to permanently cease power operations at Trojan. The facility had been shut down since November 9, 1992, when a leak in the ''B'' steam generator was detected. PGE completed defueling of the reactor on January 27, 1993. On March 24, 1993, the NRC staff issued a confirmatory order to confirm a commitment by PGE not to move new or spent fuel into the reactor building without prior NRC approval. On May 5, 1993, the Commission issued Amendment No. 190 for Facility Operating License No. NPF–1, which converted the license to a possession-only license (POL).

Section 140.11(a)(4) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, (10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)) requires each licensee to have and maintain primary nuclear liability insurance of $200 million. In addition, each licensee is required to maintain secondary financial protection in the form of private liability insurance under an industry retrospective plan. However, 10 CFR 140.8 allows the Commission, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, to grant such exemptions from the requirements of Part 140 as it determines are authorized by law and are otherwise in the public interest.

In a letter dated April 6, 1995, the licensee requested a reduction in primary financial coverage and an exemption from participation in the industry retrospective rating plan requiring secondary level coverage requirements in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). The licensee requested that the exemption become effective on November 9, 1992, 3 years from the date of final shutdown of the reactors.

III.

The licensee justified the exemption request by citing existing NRC policy that provides for exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for plants that have been permanently shut down, as presented in a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) dated July 13, 1993, on SECY–93–127, ''Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning.'' The licensee contends that as of November 9, 1995, no potential will exist for a reasonably conceivable accident at Trojan that could cause offsite damage resulting in liability claims exceeding $100 million. The licensee's conclusion is based on (1) Its analyses of operating events and design-basis accidents for Trojan in the permanently defueled condition described in the Trojan Defueled Safety Analysis Report; (2) the NRC staff's technical evaluation in SECY–93–127; and (3) the permanently shutdown status of the plant, including the significant period of elapsed time (3 years on November 9, 1995) in which the spent fuel decay heat will have had to dissipate.

The NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and technical issues associated with the application of the Price-Anderson Act to permanently shutdown reactors in SECY 93–127. In its evaluation, the staff concluded that the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act establishes a legal framework and the discretionary authority to respond to licensee requests for a reduction in the level of primary financial protection and withdrawal from participation in the industry retrospective rating plan. Depending on the plant-specific configuration and the amount of elapsed time since permanent shutdown, the staff also concluded that potential hazards may exist at permanently shutdown reactors for which financial protection is warranted. The staff further concluded that accidents and hazards insured against under the Price-Anderson Act go beyond design-basis accidents and beyond those accidents considered ''credible'' as that term is used in 10 CFR Part 100 and in cases interpreting the application of the regulation.

In the exercise of its discretionary authority, the Commission could, so long as a potential hazard existed at a permanently shutdown reactor, require the full amount of primary financial protection and full participation in the industry retrospective rating plan. At such time as the hazard is determined to no longer exist, the Commission may reduce the amount of primary financial protection and permit the licensee to withdraw from participation in the industry retrospective rating plan.

Because the legislative history does not explicitly consider the potential hazards that might exist after termination of operation, the staff generically evaluated the offsite consequences associated with normal and abnormal operations, design-basis accidents, and beyond-design-basis accidents for reactors that have been permanently defueled and shut down. The staff concluded that aside from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and radioactive materials, no potential exists for a reasonably conceivable accident that could cause significant offsite damage.

A severe transportation accident could cause local contamination requiring cleanup and offsite liabilities resulting from traffic disruption and damage to property. The possibility of this type of accident would warrant the licensee's maintaining some level of liability insurance. The liabilities and indemnification requirements associated with the transfer of spent fuel from the licensee to the Department of Energy will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in the future, when spent fuel is shipped to a repository.

The most significant accident sequence for a permanently defueled and shutdown reactor involves the complete loss of water from a light-water reactor spent fuel pool. This beyond-design-basis accident sequence could result in a zirconium fuel cladding fire that could propagate through the spent fuel storage pool and result in significant offsite consequences. Although such an accident is beyond the design bases, it may be considered ''reasonably conceivable'' and could warrant requiring substantial financial protection. Such an accident is possible during the first year after reactor shutdown for a low-density spent fuel storage configuration and during the first 2 to 3 years after shutdown for spent fuel stored in certain high-density configurations.